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Abstract 
 
An increasing number of nations allocate public funds to research institutions on the basis 
of rankings obtained from national evaluation exercises. Therefore, in non-competitive 
higher education systems where top scientists are dispersed among all the universities, 
rather than concentrated among a few, there is a high risk of penalizing those top scientists 
who work in lower-performance universities. Using a five-year bibliometric analysis 
conducted on all Italian universities active in the hard sciences from 2004-2008, this work 
analyzes the distribution of publications and relevant citations by scientists within the 
universities, measures the research performance of individual scientists, quantifies the 
intensity of concentration of top scientists at each university, provides performance 
rankings for the universities, and indicates the effects of selective funding on the top 
scientists of low-ranked universities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, an increasing number of nations, are carrying out national research 
evaluation exercises, with one of their aims being to improve allocative efficiency in public 
funding of individual institutions. Governments and their national agencies are gradually 
imposing elements of competition (Georghiou and Larédo, 2005) mainly based on: i) 
evaluations of project proposals; ii) implementation of performance-based research funding 
(PBRF) systems. Examples of this second type of system are the various Research 
Assessment Exercises of the United Kingdom (from 1986 to 2008), which have paved the 
way to the upcoming Research Evaluation Framework (to be completed in 2014), and also 
Australia’s Excellence in Research initiative (launched in 2010), which follows the earlier 
Research Quantum Composite Index (since 1995), New Zealand’s Performance-Based 
Research Fund (2006), and in Italy, the first Triennial Research Evaluation (2006), soon to 
be followed by a Quinquennial Research Evaluation (expected in 2011). 
Scholars, policy makers and administrators of research institutions are ever more 
involved in debates over the value of such exercises and, more generally, on the advisability 
or not of implementing PBRF incentive systems (Orr et al., 2007; Strehl et al., 2007; 
Shattock, 2004; Debackere and Glänzel, 2004; Rousseau and Smeyers, 2000). Geuna and 
Martin (2003) provide an exhaustive analysis of advantages and disadvantages of PBRF. 
Specific studies have been directed at questions regarding possible adverse effects of the 
incentive schemes on researcher behavior (Bhattacharya and Newhouse, 2008; Moed, 2008; 
Langford et al., 2006; Laudel, 2006; Butler, 2003). Some scholars have directly examined 
whether researchers adapt their personal production objectives to the evaluation criteria. 
Butler (2003), examining the Australian research system, and Moed (2008), for the English 
system, show that researchers tend to align themselves with the evaluation exercise 
guidelines. Auranen and Nieminen (2010), comparing funding environments for university 
research in eight countries, come to the opposite conclusion: that no straightforward 
connection exists between financial incentives and the efficiency of university systems. 
There seems to be a growing consensus for the desirability of permanent adoption of these 
types of initiative given a primary objective of stimulating and rewarding excellence in 
research institutions. However, the desired macroeconomic aims of such systems can only 
be obtained if internal redistribution of government resources within each research 
institution follows a consistent logic: the intended effects of national evaluation systems 
can result only if a “funds for quality” rule is followed at all levels of decision-making. If 
this does not occur, then the objective of stimulating greater efficiency may not be reached, 
since there will be insufficient incentives at the level of individual scientists. This becomes 
more likely with increasing dispersion of performance within the research institutions. For 
the Italian case, as demonstrated by Abramo et al. (2010)2, the overall research product of 
each university is significantly concentrated in the output of a small number of scientists. 
Italian universities all show a particularly skewed distribution of performance, which makes 
them all very similar. The variability of performance between universities is lower than 
                                                 
2This manuscript is currently under consideration for publication; an abstract is available at 
http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/laboratorioRTT/TESTI/Working%20paper/RESPOL_Cicero.pdf, last access on 
January 26, 2011. 
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within. With a scenario of this type, without a mechanism for internal redistribution 
coherent with that adopted by the central government for allocating portions of research 
funding to universities, the objectives of the PBRF system will not be realized. National 
evaluation exercises do not provide the universities with performance rankings at the level 
of individual scientists, and the universities lack suitable instruments for their measure. As 
a consequence, in higher education systems where performance differences within 
universities are notably higher than between, government funding allocations based on 
university rankings rather than on individual scientist rankings are likely to fall short of 
their purpose. 
Our objective is to provide evidence of the risks of selective funding allocations at 
institutional level in those higher education systems characterized by high dispersion of 
performance within universities. We will show the possible penalization that top scientists 
in low-ranked universities may experience, in funding terms. Through a bibliometric 
analysis conducted on all Italian universities active in the hard sciences for the five years 
from 2004-2008, we will analyze the distribution of performance within universities in two 
scenarios: under the observed scenario with their top scientists and in a hypothetical 
scenario “without”. We will measure the concentrations of top scientists in each university 
and relate these to the performance classifications for the universities. Simulating a 
selective allocation of resources to universities, similar to that generally adopted, we will 
show what effects such a system has on top scientists of low-ranked universities, and thus 
on the macroeconomic objective of rewarding excellence.  
The next section of the work presents the methodology used, the dataset for the 
analyses, and the type of indicator used to measure both individual and university 
performance. Section 3 illustrates the results of the analyses conducted and the last section 
presents the related policy implications.  
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
The field of observation consists of all Italian universities active in the hard sciences (a 
total of 77 institutions), observed over the five-year period 2004-2008. Research 
performance is measured through bibliometric techniques, essentially applying an impact 
indicator related to citations. For the hard sciences, the literature gives ample justification 
for this choice of performance indicator suggesting that : i) scientific publications are a 
good proxy of overall research output (Moed et al., 2004); and ii) citations are a good proxy 
of impact on scientific advancement, notwithstanding the possible distortions inherent in 
this indicator (Glanzel, 2008). 
 
 
2.1 Dataset 
 
The dataset used for the analyses was constructed based on the Observatory of Public 
Research (ORP)3, a database developed and maintained by the authors under license from 
                                                 
3 www.orp.researchvalue.it, last access on January 26, 2011. 
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the Thomson Reuters Web of Science (WoS). Beginning from the Italian raw data indexed 
in the WoS, then applying a complex algorithm for reconciliation of the authors’ affiliation 
and disambiguation of the true identity of the authors, each publication (articles, reviews, 
and conference proceedings) is attributed to the university scientists that produced it, with 
an error of less than 5% (D’Angelo et al., 2011). 
In the Italian system of classification, the hard sciences are grouped in nine University 
Disciplinary Areas (UDAs4) and 205 Scientific Disciplinary Sector (SDSs5). Each 
university researcher is classified in only one SDS6. To render the analyses more 
significant, the field of observation was limited to those SDSs in which at least 50% of the 
scientists produced at least one publication in the period 2004-2008. In the 183 SDSs thus 
examined, over the 2004-2008 period, there were an average of 39,508 scientists (equal to 
58.3% of total Italian university researchers), distributed in 77 universities (Table 1). 
 
UDA N. of SDSs Universities Research staff 
Mathematics and computer sciences 9 64 3,515 
Physics 8 61 2,873 
Chemistry 11 59 3,603 
Earth sciences 12 48 1,439 
Biology 19 66 5,785 
Medicine 47 55 12,196 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 28 48 3,153 
Civil engineering 7 49 1,455 
Industrial and information engineering 42 68 5,489 
Total 183 77 39,508 
Table 1: Universities and research staff in the hard sciences of the Italian academic system; data 2004-
2008 
 
 
2.2 Indicators 
 
For measurement of research performance, the study uses the indicator Scientific 
Strength (SS), equal to the sum of the standardized citations of all publications by a 
researcher, each standardized citation divided by the number of co-authors of the 
publication. Citations of a publication are standardized dividing them by the median7 of 
citations8 of all Italian publications of the same year and WoS subject category9. 
                                                 
4 Mathematics and computer sciences; Physics; Chemistry; Earth sciences; Biology; Medicine; Agriculture 
and veterinary sciences; Civil engineering; Industrial and information engineering. 
5 Complete list available at http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/settori/index.php, last access on January 26, 
2011. 
6 In Italy, all personnel enter the university system through public examinations, and career advancement also 
requires such public examinations. Classification of scientists into SDSs, make it easier to formulate 
examinations calls and select members of the examination committees. 
7 The decision to standardize citations with respect to the median number (rather than to the average, as 
frequently observed in the literature) is justified by the fact that the distribution of citations is highly skewed 
(Lundberg, 2007). 
8 Observed at 30/06/2009. 
9 When a publication falls in two or more subject categories the average of the medians is used. 
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In the case of the life sciences (biology, biomedical research, and clinical medicine)10 
different weights have been given to each co-author according to his/her position in the list 
and the character of the co-authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural). For each scientist in the 
dataset, the indicator described is subsequently divided by the number of years out of the 
five observed in which the individual held an official post in an Italian university faculty. 
The performance of each scientist is thus compared with that of his/her colleagues in the 
same SDS, in order to take into account the varying intensity of publication and citation for 
different sectors (Abramo and D’Angelo, 2011). Expressing individual performance within 
each SDS as a percentile rank, it is then possible to compare scientists belonging to 
different disciplines.  
The university performance rankings are prepared: i) by SDS, calculating the above 
indicator through aggregation of the standardized citations for the researchers that compose 
it and dividing by the number of research staff in the SDS; ii) by UDA, aggregating the data 
for the SDSs through operations of standardization and weighting, to avoid possible 
distortion inherent in analyses at this level of aggregation. The analytic formula for the 
Scientific Strength (SSUDA) in a given UDA of a given university is: 
*
1
UDAn
s s
UDA
UDAs s
SS Add
SS
AddP
 
  
 
  
where: 
SSs = SS per faculty-member of the SDS s 
Ps
* = average SS of Italian universities in SDS s 
Adds = number of scientist in SDS s 
AddUDA = number of scientists in the UDA 
nUDA = number of SDSs in the UDA 
 
The operations for standardizing and weighting values for the SDSs of a UDA permit 
taking into account the diverse fertility of the SDSs and their varying representativeness, in 
terms of members, in each UDA (Abramo et al., 2008). 
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Distribution of performance for Italian university researchers 
 
Our earlier work shows that the Italian higher education system has high or very high 
levels of concentration of performance within universities (Abramo et al., 2010). This is 
caused in part by a substantial share of non-productive researchers11. In the 183 SDSs 
analyzed, there are 6,640 “non-productives” out of total 39,508 scientists (17%). The 
descriptive statistics for the non-productives, by UDA, are presented in Table 2. The UDA 
                                                 
10 In these fields order in the authors’ list reflects the varying contribution of the authors to the article. In other 
fields the alphabetical order is the norm. 
11 “Non-productive” researchers are defined as those for whom it is not possible to identify articles, reviews 
or conference proceedings in the WoS, for the period 2004-2008. 
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showing the lowest share of non-productives is Chemistry (7%), with a minimum for the 
SDS of Organic chemistry (CHIM/06), at 4%. The UDA Civil engineering shows the 
highest percentage (29%). It should be noted that the percentages of non-productives are 
inversely correlated to the average intensity of publication in the various sectors. On 
average, for all the SDSs, 29% of the researchers produce 71% of the total output.  
 
UDA N. of SDSs Min Max Average 
Mathematics and computer sciences 9 11% (MAT/09) 37% (MAT/01) 23% 
Physics 8 7% (FIS/03) 49% (FIS/08) 16% 
Chemistry 11 4% (CHIM/06) 13% (CHIM/12) 7% 
Earth sciences 12 10% (GEO/03) 42% (GEO/05) 19% 
Biology 19 5% (BIO/18) 34% (BIO/03) 14% 
Medicine 47 6% (MED/07) 43% (MED/45) 20% 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 28 5% (VET/03) 50% (AGR/10) 18% 
Civil engineering 7 22% (ICAR/03) 40% (ICAR/05) 29% 
Industrial and information engineering 42 2% (ING-IND/34) 48% (ING-IND/02) 21% 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for percentages of non-productive researchers, by UDA 
 
Next we observe that out of 39,508 researchers, 9,701 (25% of total) have a nil 
impact12. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for these researchers. The UDA that 
registers the lowest percentage of scientists with nil SS is again Chemistry (9% on 
average), with an absolute minimum in CHIM/06 (5%). The highest percentage is seen in 
Civil engineering (47% on average), although the absolute maximum for an SDS is seen in 
Industrial and Information engineering, specifically in Naval and Marine construction and 
installation (ING-IND/02). In general, there is strong heterogeneity of data for the SDSs 
within the individual areas. For example, Industrial and Information engineering, which we 
observed has the SDS with the absolute maximum percentage of scientists at nil SS, also 
shows a minimum value as low as 7% (Industrial bioengineering - ING-IND/34). In 
Physics, the figures for minimum (8%) and maximum (68%) of scientists with nil impact 
again show a remarkable spread, at least between the two extremes, for History of physics, 
FIS/08 and Physics of condensed matter, FIS/03. 
 
UDA N. of SDSs Min Max Average 
Mathematics and computer sciences 9 18% (MAT/09) 53% (MAT/03) 37% 
Physics 8 8% (FIS/03) 68% (FIS/08) 23% 
Chemistry 11 5% (CHIM/03) 15% (CHIM/12) 9% 
Earth sciences 12 12% (GEO/10) 59% (GEO/05) 27% 
Biology 19 9% (BIO/17) 43% (BIO/02) 18% 
Medicine 47 8% (MED/07) 50% (MED/35 - 45) 25% 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 28 9% (VET/02) 78% (AGR/10) 31% 
Civil engineering 7 35% (ICAR/03) 62% (ICAR/05) 47% 
Industrial and Information engineering 42 7% (ING-IND/34) 87% (ING-IND/02) 36% 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for percentages of researchers with nil impact, by UDA 
 
Overall, 23% of researchers produce 77% of the total scientific strength. Naturally, this 
                                                 
12 In this analysis, the scientists with nil SS include the non-productives and the researchers who published 
but did not receive any citations. 
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has a great influence on measures of inequality: Table 4 presents the ratio between 
cumulative performance of scientists situated in the bottom 40% and the top 20%13 of each 
SDS rank listing. 
 
UDA N. of SDSs Max Average 
Mathematics and computer sciences 9 0.064 (MAT/09) 0.013 
Physics 8 0.106 (FIS/03) 0.044 
Chemistry 11 0.234 (CHIM/11) 0.105 
Earth sciences 12 0.125 (GEO/10) 0.036 
Biology 19 0.129 (BIO/19) 0.041 
Medicine 47 0.077 (MED/03) 0.015 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 28 0.101 (VET/02) 0.026 
Civil engineering 7 0.010 (ICAR/03) 0.002 
Industrial and information engineering 42 0.137 (ING-IND/24) 0.025 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the ratio of cumulative SS from the bottom 40% to cumulative SS from 
top 20% of scientists, by UDA 
 
The average values of the ratio confirm the high values of concentration within each 
disciplinary area. Chemistry is somewhat of an exception, and in Chemistry and 
biotechnology of fermentations - CHIM/11, the ratio reaches an absolute maximum value 
(0.234). The absolute minimum occurs in an SDS of Civil engineering: in Environmental 
and Health Engineering (ICAR/03), where the bottom 40% cumulatively produce 1% of 
cumulative output from the top 20%. 
 
 
3.2 The impact of top scientists on university rankings 
 
Allocation of resources to universities on the basis of the rankings obtained from 
national research assessment exercise can reduce or totally deprive some universities of 
public funds. Further, universities generally do not posses the instruments for comparative 
evaluation of single scientist performance. Considering that research groups have various 
capabilities in negotiating funding, not necessarily related to merits, this could then cause 
internal allocation of resources that is not efficient. Given this situation, it is interesting to 
ask what would happen to the ranking position of each university if the top scientists were 
excluded from the evaluation. In this section we analyze the observed performances of 
universities as well as their performances under a hypothetical case in which bibliometric 
analysis excludes the top scientists, equal in number to 20% of the research staff of each 
SDS at a university. As an example, we present the situation of universities operating in 
CHIM/06. There are 35 universities with a staff of at least five researchers. Table 5 shows 
their relative rankings under the two scenarios, the positive or negative shift and the Gini 
coeffecient14 calculated for the observed scenario of distribution of all research staff in the 
                                                 
13 This measure varies between 0 and 100%. The closer the ratio to zero, the greater the difference in average 
performance between these sub-populations, noting also that the first group (bottom 40%) is always double 
the number of the second (top 20%). 
14 Gini coefficient here is a measure of the inequality of research productivity: a value of 0 suggests that the 
variation among scientists is nil: a value of 1 indicates maximal inequality. 
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SDS at the university. In this scenario, we can observe immediately that high-ranked 
universities have high Gini coefficient. The two sets of rankings related to observed and 
hypothetical scenario are significantly correlated (Spearman  = 0.655, p-value < 0.000), 
though in the presence of considerable shifts in ranking in many universities. Out of a total 
of 35 universities, 19 gain position, 12 lose position and four remain stable. Of the 19 
universities that gain position, eight rise more than five positions; while of the 12 
universities that decline, six descend more than five positions. We also observe that in the 
cases of the greater negative shifts, there is also a greater value of concentration, and vice 
versa. For example, the University of Trieste, which loses 26 positions between the first and 
second scenarios, has a concentration value of 0.783. Vice versa, the University of Rome 
“Tor Vergata”, with a concentration value for performance of 0.415, is the university that 
registers the greatest jump in rank (+15 positions). In general, we observe greater positive 
shifts in position for universities with lesser concentration of performance.  
To evaluate the extent of the phenomenon we carried out a correlation analysis between 
variation in ranking and the Gini coefficient. Figure 1 presents the dispersion graph and the 
trend line for data concerning the 35 universities considered. The Spearman value, equaling 
-0.805, is highly significant (p-value < 0.000), indicating that the universities with more 
homogenous performance in the SDS rise in position between the observed scenario and 
the analysis that excludes the top performers in the SDS, and vice versa. The same 
correlation calculations as for CHIM/06 were carried out for all the SDSs in the field of 
observation, limiting the analysis, for reasons of significance, to SDSs with at least 5 
universities15. The results, presented in aggregate form per UDA, in Table 6, consistently 
show negative correlation values, except in a very few cases (GEO/03, VET/10, ING-
INF/07), which were all not statistically significant. 
 
Universities 
Observed scenario 
(rank) 
Hypothetical 
scenario 
(rank) 
Sign ∆ Gini* 
University of Trieste 1 27 - 26 0.783 
University of L’Aquila 2 2 = 0 0.630 
University of Pisa 3 13 - 10 0.667 
University of Ferrara 4 31 - 27 0.730 
University of Padova 5 1 + 4 0.549 
University of Bologna 6 11 - 5 0.607 
University of Salerno 7 7 = 0 0.525 
University of Camerino 8 4 + 4 0.536 
University of Palermo 9 3 + 6 0.487 
University of Siena 10 14 - 4 0.499 
University of Parma 11 8 + 3 0.479 
University of Florence 12 12 = 0 0.531 
University of Basilicata 13 5 + 8 0.384 
University of Sassari 14 16 - 2 0.550 
University of Rome "La Sapienza" 15 17 - 2 0.572 
University of Eastern Piedmont 16 22 - 6 0.593 
University of Perugia 17 9 + 8 0.403 
University of Pavia 18 25 - 7 0.610 
                                                 
15 With less than five observations the Gini coefficient would lose significance. 
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University of Calabria 19 15 + 4 0.509 
University of Insubria 20 10 + 10 0.358 
University of Rome "Tor Vergata" 21 6 + 15 0.415 
University of Turin 22 26 - 4 0.561 
University of Venice “Ca' Foscari” 23 21 + 2 0.461 
University of Urbino "Carlo Bo" 24 20 + 4 0.445 
University of Naples "Federico II" 25 18 + 7 0.449 
University of Milan 26 24 + 2 0.521 
University of Bari 27 23 + 4 0.536 
University of Genova 28 34 - 6 0.641 
University of Milan Bicocca 29 19 + 10 0.251 
University of Messina 30 29 + 1 0.394 
Politechnic of Ancona 31 30 + 1 0.385 
University of Catania 32 33 - 1 0.480 
University of Modena and Reggio E. 33 32 + 1 0.460 
University of Chieti “G. D'Annunzio” 34 28 + 6 0.244 
University of Cagliari 35 35 = 0 0.520 
Table 5: Variations in performance ranking under observed and hypothetical scenarios for universities in 
Organic chemistry, with values for concentration 
*Data for the observed scenario 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Correlation between variations in ranking (between observed and hypothetical scenarios) and 
Gini index for the 35 universities active in CHIM/06 
 
UDA Min Max Significant SDSs* 
Mathematics and computer sciences -0.883 (MAT/06**) -0.432 (MAT/03**) 8 out of 8 
Physics -0.853 (FIS/03**) -0.561 (FIS/02**) 6 out of 7 
Chemistry -0.838 (CHIM/02**) -0.435 (CHIM/09*) 7 out of 8 
Earth sciences -0.909 (GEO/10*) 0.055 (GEO/03) 6 out of 10 
Biology -0.896 (BIO/19**) -0.221 (BIO/08) 14 out of 18 
Medicine -0.956 (MED/46**) -0.110 (MED/12) 28 out of 39 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences -0.746 (AGR/12**) 0.109 (VET/10) 10 out of 25 
Civil engineering -0.699 (ICAR/08**) -0.522 (ICAR/09**) 5 out of 6 
Industrial and Information engineering -0.986 (ING-IND/06**) 0.053 (ING-INF/07) 13 out of 28 
0
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for correlations between variations in ranking (between observed and 
hypothetical scenarios) and Gini index for the SDSs in each UDA 
Significance level: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01 
 
The same simulation as for CHIM/06 was conducted for all the SDSs, to provide 
university rankings at the level of UDA. 
The statistics for comparison between rankings are presented in Table 7. 
 
UDA N of Variations Max Δ - Max Δ + Average Median 
Mathematics and computer sciences 42 out of 50 (84%) -11 10 2.7 3.0 
Physics 46 out of 48 (96%) -17 16 5.8 4.0 
Chemistry 34 out of 41 (83%) -8 10 2.7 2.0 
Earth sciences 29 out of 32 (91%)  -8 5 2.3 2.0 
Biology 44 out of 49 (90%) -15 13 4.5 4.0 
Medicine 36 out of 42 (86%) -11 11 4.0 3.0 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 22 out of 25 (88%) -6 6 2.5 2.0 
Civil engineering 24 out of 31 (77%) -11 10 2.7 2.0 
Industrial and information engineering 40 out of 42 (95%) -21 22 6.1 4.0 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for shifts in performance ranking of universities, for each UDA 
 
In general, we see that the percentage of universities affected by variation in rank 
ranges from 77% in Civil engineering to 96% in Physics. Industrial and information 
engineering shows both the maximum negative (-21) and positive (+22) shifts between the 
two rankings. In the other areas the maximum shifts, while lesser, are still sizeable, 
especially in Physics (+16), Biology (+13), Medicine (+11), as well as in Mathematics and 
computer sciences, Chemistry and Civil engineering (+10). There are notable negative 
shifts in the areas of Physics (-17), Biology (-15), and Mathematics and computer science, 
Medicine and Civil engineering (both -11). 
For an example in detail, we show the situation for the Industrial and information 
engineering UDA, which registers the greatest variability between the two sets of rankings. 
Over the period considered, there are 42 Italian universities with at least 5 scientists in at 
least one of the SDSs in this area. Table 8 shows the shifts in quintile between the 
university rankings obtained from the observed distribution and those from the hypothetical 
scenario, eliminating the top scientists.  
 
  Hypothetical scenario 
 Performance Very High High Medium Low Very Low Total 
O
b
se
rv
ed
 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Very high 7 2 0 0 0 9 
High 2 2 1 2 1 8 
Medium 0 2 4 1 1 8 
Low 0 2 2 4 0 8 
Very Low 0 0 1 1 7 9 
Total 9 8 8 8 9 42 
Table 8: Variations in performance (quintile) of universities active in Industrial and information 
engineering, between observed and hypothetical scenarios 
 
Out of 42 universities, 24 (57% of total) do not show any variation in quintile. Of the 
remaining 18 universities, 11 shift to an adjacent quintile: four to the next lowest and seven 
11 
 
to the next highest. Another six universities shift two quintiles: three shift downwards and 
three upwards. The University of Bari registers the greatest shift, moving downwards a full 
3 quintiles: without its top scientists, the performance of this university drops from “High” 
to “Very Low”.  
 
3.4 The distribution of top national scientists 
 
In the preceding sections we showed that with the high levels of concentration such as 
seen in the Italian universities, if top scientists of each university are excluded from 
performance calculations, there are substantial changes and reversals in university rankings.  
In this section we assess the extent to which research funding systems based on 
university rankings can penalize the nation’s best scientists. We now refer to “top” 
scientists as those who fall in the top 20% of the national rankings per SDS, independently 
of the university to which they belong. We correlate their numbers, in terms of their 
occurrence on the total research staff of a university, with the position of the university 
itself in the rankings at the level of UDA. We then subdivide the rankings into four classes, 
as provided in the four research profile classes applied by the UK RAE evaluation of 
universities16. Further to this scheme, the Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
has adopted a PBRF program17 which does not assign any funds to universities that placed 
in the bottom class. Universities with an evaluation of their research profile as first class 
receive (under equal numbers of research staff) three times more funds of universities in the 
second class, which in turn receive three times as much as those in the third class. By 
analogy, we divide the university rankings for each Italian UDA into quartiles that simulate 
a distribution of funds like that of the HEFCE system.  
In Table 9, as an example, we present the rankings for the 48 universities active in 
Physics and, in the last column, the number and percentages of top national scientists in the 
total Physics research staff of each university.  
Clearly, universities placing in the last quartile still include top national scientists 
among their staff. For example, at the University of Parma, 10 researchers (out of 73 total) 
have top scientist performance. Udine, last in the Physics rankings, with a research staff of 
18 individuals has 3 top scientists. Overall, 62 of the 571 Italian top scientists work in the 
universities positioned in the last quartile. Under the HEFCE criteria these would be 
excluded from funding. There are also 204 top national scientists working in the 
universities that placed in the second quartile, compared to only 156 in the first quartile 
universities. Paradoxically, a class of universities with a greater number of top scientists 
would receive one third of the funding given to a class with less top scientists.  
A further paradox emerges when we compare the universities in the first and last 
quartiles. As an example, we consider the situations of the Bari Polytechnic and the 
University of Salento. The former university, due to its position in the last quartile under an 
HEFCE type system, would not receive any funds even though it has three national top 
scientists, representing 21% of its research staff. The University of Salento on the other 
                                                 
16 In reality, the RAE includes a fifth level, termed “Unclassified”, which is not considered in our simulation. 
For detail see http://www.rae.ac.uk/aboutus/quality.asp, last access on January 26, 2011. 
17 For detail: http://www.hefce.ac.uk/research/funding/qrfunding/, last access on January 26, 2011. 
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hand, placing in the first national quartile (12th of 48), would benefit from substantial 
funding that would support the activities, not only of the 16 top scientists, but also of their 
61 institutional colleagues with scientific performance that is less than that of Bari 
Polytechnic’s top scientists.  
  
ra
n
k
 
University 
Top 
scientists ra
n
k
 
University 
Top 
scientists 
1 University of Brescia 5 (31%) 25 University of Salerno 7 (15%) 
2 University “G. D'Annunzio” in Chieti 3 (38%) 26 University of Milan 21 (17%) 
3 Milan Polytechnic 27 (48%) 27 
University of Urbino 
“Carlo Bo”  
3 (33%) 
4 Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa 7 (29%) 28 University of Bologna 23 (16%) 
5 University of Trento 18 (41%) 29 University of Firenze 20 (16%) 
6 
International School for Advanced 
Studies of Trieste 
16 (48%) 30 University of Genoa 14 (14%) 
7 University “Ca' Foscari” in Venice 3 (43%) 31 University of Pisa 16 (15%) 
8 University of Calabria 18 (33%) 32 University of Catania 10 (10%) 
9 University of Camerino 7 (27%) 33 
University of Rome “Tor 
Vergata” 
14 (14%) 
10 University of Palermo 20 (27%) 34 University of Basilicata 2 (17%) 
11 Torino Polytechnic 16 (34%) 35 University of Messina 7 (13%) 
12 University of Salento 16 (21%) 36 University of Trieste 12 (18%) 
13 University of Modena and Reggio E. 14 (33%) 37 University of Parma 10 (14%) 
14 University of Insubria 9 (32%) 38 University of L'Aquila 10 (19%) 
15 Ancona Polytechnic 5 (31%) 39 University of Perugia 5 (11%) 
16 University of Milan “Bicocca” 20 (27%) 40 University of Verona 2 (25%) 
17 University of Naples “Federico II” 36 (20%) 41 University of Bari 8 (12%) 
18 University of Rome “La Sapienza” 41 (21%) 42 University of Cagliari 10 (18%) 
19 University of Eastern Piedmont 2 (12%) 43 University of Pavia 11 (14%) 
20 University of Padua 32 (20%) 44 
Sacred Heart Catholic 
University 
0 (0%) 
21 Second University of Naples 1 (7%) 45 University of Sassari 0 (0%) 
22 University of “Roma Tre” 15 (28%) 46 Bari Polytechnic 3 (20%) 
23 University of Ferrara 10 (20%) 47 University of Siena 0 (0%) 
24 University of Turin 19 (19%) 48 University of Udine 3 (17%) 
Table 9: Ranking and subdivision of list into quartiles for universities active in Physics, with numerosity of 
their top national scientists 
 
The phenomenon illustrated for Physics is pertinent to practically all UDAs. Table 10 
shows the occurrence of top scientists in universities ranked in the last quartile for each 
UDA. The extreme case of Medicine, the largest area for size, is particularly striking. Here, 
490 of the top 2,457 national scientists work in universities where the average performance 
is in the last national quartile. Overall, 13% of the nation’s top scientists (1,045 of 7,980 
total), despite top personal scientific performance, would receive no funds under the 
HEFCE scheme. 
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UDA 
Top scientists in 
universities of the last 
quartile 
Total national top 
scientists 
Incidence 
Mathematics and computer sciences 81 708 11% 
Physics 62 571 11% 
Chemistry 61 726 8% 
Earth sciences 21 295 7% 
Biology 138 1,165 12% 
Medicine 490 2,457 20% 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 55 643 9% 
Civil engineering 28 296 9% 
Industrial and information engineering 109 1,110 10% 
Total 1,045 7,980 13% 
Table 10: Occurrence of top national scientists in universities positioned in the last quartile, per UDA 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The rapid diffusion of national research assessment exercises with the aim of improving 
allocative efficiency in public funding of individual institutions poses an interesting series 
of questions for scholars in the field. The literature suggests that permanent adoption of 
these types of initiatives is desirable, given that their primary objective is to stimulate and 
reward excellence in public research organizations. However, the debate seems to ignore 
the importance of the context into which such systems are inserted. Logic suggests that 
basing government funding on rankings from university research assessment exercises will 
be more efficient in competitive higher education systems, such as those in the English-
speaking nations. The competition in such systems, which long predates the 
implementation of research assessment exercise, has caused the emergence of top 
universities with staffs of high average research performance and low variability in 
performance. However in non-competitive systems, the variability of performance within 
universities is higher than it is between them. In competitive systems, selective allocation 
of university funding has a high probability of funding the top scientists, since they are 
concentrated in the best universities. In less competitive systems, with high dispersion of 
top scientist among universities, selective funding will inevitably be less efficient, unless 
assessment exercises also make available individual-level performance rankings to inform 
selective allocation within universities (for example as proposed in a recent work by 
Abramo and D’Angelo, 2010). In other words, the macroeconomic aims of research 
assessment exercises conducted in less competitive higher education systems can only be 
obtained if the logic of “funds for quality” extends down to all levels of decision-making, 
particularly to the internal redistribution of the received funds. If this does not occur then it 
is possible that, lacking incentives for individual scientists, the objective of stimulating 
better efficiency will not be reached.  
To test this logic, the study proposed an analysis of the Italian academic system, of all 
universities active in the hard sciences over the period 2004-2008. The analysis revealed 
that 29% of researchers produce 71% of total publications. A full 25% of researchers 
obtained no citations over the five-year period, and 23% produced 77% of total impact. 
Similar distributions occur within the individual universities. With such high values of 
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concentration and unproductivity, it is above all the top scientists who determine 
differences in performance among the universities. We compared the observed situation 
with a hypothetical scenario that excluded the contribution of the top 20% of scientists for 
each SDS of each university. The rankings under the two scenarios, although correlated, 
show the biggest negative shifts for universities with a high concentration of performance. 
In non-competitive higher education systems the risk is that top scientists of lower-ranked 
universities will be strongly penalized in terms of funding compared to top-scientists in 
higher-ranked universities. Additionally there is a high probability that top scientists in 
lower-ranked universities will receive less funds than lower-performer colleagues, who 
have the good luck to work in universities with a higher average performance.  
In the context of higher education systems with high concentration of performance 
within universities, we recommend funding allocations based on individual level rankings 
rather than on university rankings in order to support maximal productivity among the 
research community.  
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